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Ethics As Grammar:
A Note on Method and the Treatise on Good Works
Don Irvine

Master of Theology Student, Waterloo Lutheran Seminmy
Waterloo, Ontario
One criterion for the analysis of moral theory is that the method
employed be appropriate to the content of the moral view to be
analyzed. Philosophical methodology is not always conducive to
theological analysis. ' Whatever else it is, Martin Luther's Treatise 011
Good Work1 is primarily a theological document; it is generated in a
world that John Webster describes as having a "moral ontology." 3
Contrary to modern ethical theory, the document is written against the
background of an order of being, a metaphysical framework, in which
moral agents and human action are identified in the ~ontext of an
orientation to the Good construed in terms of the action of God.
Morality on this view is neither a function of consciousness,
culture or human autonomy; rather, it is an orientation to a creative
divine agency understood as the complete origin, substance and
fulfillment of all human action. The human person is envisaged as
existing within a moral reality independent of attitude and
disposition. The fact that such a moral orientation is characterized by
views of revelation, faith, prayer, Christian action and commandment
modulates what can count as an appropriate method of ethical
analysis.
Contemporary ethical methodologies very often preclude issues
arising from the kind of moral ontology found in the Treatise 011
Good Works. For example, modern ethical theory has been dominated
by theories of either a teleological (Utilitarianism) or a deontological
(Formalism) type. In both instances the interest is in the formation of
a criterion for decision-making which appeals to either (a) the
greatest happiness for the greatest number of people or (b) a
categorical imperative which is a rule requiring action which every
rational being, independent of aim, must observe. In both instances
the emphasis falls on normative moral standards as determinants of
decision-making, human autonomy, and the creation of a theory of
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moral obligation based on some basic rule or principle. Such theories
are of interest for theological ethicists but hardly capture the
theological nuances ofthe moral world ofLuther. One ethicist names
the issue thus:
There is no reason to deny that the biblical record
and Christian tradition manifest deontological and
teleological tendencies, but it is mistaken to assume
that Christian ethics requires us to choose either
alternative or some combination of the two. For
when we do so we inevitably tend to abstract the
Christian "ethic" from its rationale by subordinating
theological convictions to prior formal patterns of
ethical argument. 4
An interesting alternative to Utilitarian and Formalist views is
found in those contemporary theorists acquainted with the views of
Aristotle and Aquinas who evince an interest in virtue and the ethics
of character. The work of Alasdair Maclntyre,S for example, has
excited Christian theologians who found much of interest in new
themes such as practice, human agency, the role of narrative and
community in moral formation. Other writers emerged who have
sought to apply the views of Ludwig Wittgenstein to matters
theological. In 1985 James C. Edward in his perceptive book Ethics
Without Philosophy: Wittgenstein and the Moral Life ( 1982) claims
that Wittgenstein's central concern throughout his philosophical career
was ethics, a "mystical" sphere because its content cannot be said or
stated but only shown. While theological concerns did not loom large
in Edward's analysis, such was not the case with Fergus Kerr, 6 who
called for a radical revision in our thinking about moral psychology.
His view was a serious study of Wittgenstein 's method of linguistic
analysis and its implications for traditional views of rational
autonomy, theistic argument and the nature of the self/soul. Kerr's use
ofWittgenstein's method to address important theological and moral
issues has been extended by a contemporary writer, Brad Kallenberg1
who offers a more extensive analysis of the Theological Ethics of
Stanley Hauerwas under aspects ofWittgenstein. One year prior to the
publication of Kallenberg's book, James McClendon published the
third volume of his Systematic Theology in which Chapter Six is
http://scholars.wlu.ca/consensus/vol29/iss2/4
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entitled "Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Christian in Philosophy."R
Apparently, Wittgenstein has been of interest to some theologians.

Grammar of Theology
Is it even likely that some aspects ofWittgenstein's linguistic method
can offer assistance in understanding the theology of Luther s
Treatise on Good Works? There is reason to think so. Wittgenstein
himself made reference to theology draw attention to the use of
language. In the Philosophical Investigations he states:
One ought to ask, not what images are or what
happens when one imagines anything, but how the
word "imagination [Vorstellung]" is used. But that
does not mean that I want to talk only about words.
For the question as to the nature (Wesen) of the
imagination is as much about the word
"imagination" as my question is. And I am only
saying that this question is not to be decided neither for the person who does the imagining, nor
for anyone else - by pointing; nor yet by a
description of any process. The first question also
asks for a word to be explained but it makes us
expect a wrong kind of answer. Essence (Wesen) is
expressed by grammar.Q
The next comment attends to certain elements of grammar,
language and ostensive definition which is then followed by the
remark: "Grammar tells us what kind of object anything is.
(Theology as grammar.)" 10 Wittgenstein's point is that simply asking
what ideas or images are, is to construe the inquiry as one where we
seek to locate them by introspection assuming that such words
denote. But this often becomes a source of philosophical confusion.
To propose that we understand these words by considering how we
use them in conversation about the inner life evokes the response that
we are talking only about "words" rather than the thing itself. But, as
Fergus Kerr claims, Wittgenstein's point is that questions about the
inner life are not settled in this manner at all; the answer lies in a
careful inspection of the kinds of things that we are permitted to say
given the rules of the conversation. 11 The kind of object that a thing
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is will come out in the kind of things that it is appropriate to say about
it. This applies to the words "God" and "soul" as well as
"imagination." To explain what the word "God" means we have to
listen to what it is permissible to say about the subject.
Wittgenstein had previously noted that we might often give up
explaining words such as "God" or "soul" ostensively, by pointing;
we don't give up explaining them in substantival terms. He says:
Luther said that theology is the grammar of the word
"God." I interpret this to mean that an investigation
of the word would be a grammatical one. For
example, people might dispute about how many
anns God had, and someone might enter the dispute
by denying that one could talk about arms of God.
This would throw light on the use of the word. What
is ridiculous or blasphemous also shows the
grammar of the word. 1 ~
This account seems right. Theology in fact has typically involved
much critical reflection on what is said about the divine. Theology
certainly involves learning what may rightly be said and what has to
be excluded people typically involves critical reflection of what
people can appropriately say about the divine. Indeed, on
Wittgenstein 's view of theological grammar the entire Treatise on
Good Works can be construed as an attempt to remedy aberrant
theological usage by recalling discourse about good works to its
proper theological context.
In what sense does Wittgenstein mean that "theology is the
grammar of the word 'God"' and how does this reflect on Luther's
uniquely theological view about human action? Brad Kallenberg
alludes to a remark by Wittgenstein, "How words are understood is
not told by words alone (Theology)," and introduces it with the
statement: "The suggestion that communication requires selfinvolving participation of speakers in the host fonn of life has
interesting implications for Wittgenstein's view of religious
language." One implication, according to Kallenberg, is that crossing
the communication gap requires direct participation in that form of
life in which the concept functions. He describes this as becoming
familiar with the "grammar of such a concept" before engaging in
http://scholars.wlu.ca/consensus/vol29/iss2/4
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conversation." It is, as Kallenberg puts it, " ... the necessity of a selfinvolving participation in a given form of life for cultivating the skill
of hearing the connections between a sentence and appropriate
aspects of its context .... " 13
Now the term "grammar" is used by Luther in the Lectures on
Galatians and his remark on Galatians 3: 11 speaks of an explanation
"according to a new and theological grammar" while on verse 3: 15
he speaks about consulting the grammar - "not the moral grammar
but the theological grammar." 1 ~ In an excellent study ofLuther's view
of theological and revelatory language, Risto Saarinen 11 notes that
Johann Eck remarked that Luther believed grammar to be the most
important part of philosophy. Eck is referring to Luther's theses in
Conclusiones tractantes, a libri philosphorum sint utiles aut inutiles
ad theologiam where Luther states that the holy doctrine of theology
is conveyed by words so the science of grammar is the most
important of the arts for propagating theology. 1" Saarinen also notes
Luther's insistence "that the student of theology should not study the
rules for putting words together on the basis of philosophical
textbooks but ought to become acquainted with the everyday use of
the language." 17 The art of theological grammar must be distinguished
from philosophical grammar because of the presence of unusual
subject matter, the new entity (nova res). Luther insists that the way
of understanding this new entity and the modes of speaking about its
propet1ies must be unique, although these new ways and modes are
nevertheless conveyed by the normal, everyday use of language.
This meant, according to Saarinen, that grammar can never
simply be a speculative endeavour, a formal or syntactic discipline of
classifying signs, carried out by scholastics. Rather, the specific art of
each grammar is determined by its use of the words and, accordingly,
by the signification of those words. This, as Saarinen rightly
determines, is to give priority to the semantic and pragmatic features
of language. This means that grammar for Luther includes not only
words in a language, their relations with other words, together with
their meaning or application, but also the relation between words and
the world as well as the relation of words to their users. The inclusion
of these pragmatic and semantic features and the unusual subject
matter together compose a unique Grammatico theologica which is
what Luther has in mind when he aims to outline an "alternative
theological semantic which he often refers to as a 'new' grammar." 18
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If Saarinen's analysis obtains, then Luther's theological grammar
is a complex of elements: It includes a speaker's use of ordinary
language in some context of reference or meaning, the relations
between words and what they are about (semantics) as well as the
relation of speakers and words (pragmatics). Since Luther does not
systematize an overview of theological grammar, it would be of
assistance to provide an interpretation which could further an
understanding of human action implicit in "Good works." This is a
case of particular interest since it is a major theme in The Treatise on
Good Works, and Luther makes it very clear that there is a unique
usage, a special theological grammar of"doing," properly understood
as a "doing with faith." 19 But we do require an understanding of the
theological grammar of "doing with faith" which is a unique way of
understanding the use of ordinary words?
One contemporary proposal to capture the key elements in
Wittgenstein's analysis of meaning germane to this unique
understanding is that offered by Brad Kallenberg. He begins with an
analysis of the concept of "fonn" found in the developing views of
Wittgenstein from his early to later writings. Navigating a diversity of
interpretations, he indicates the earliest use of "fonn" to denote the
logical structure of reality in the Tractatus; while after 1931 the word
became associated with the phrase "language games" which spoke of
the irreducible social character of human life. The notion "fonn of
life" then began to predominate in Wittgenstein's later views and in
the Philosophical Grammar "fonn" becomes analogous to "grammar"
that "describes the use of words in the language." 20 Meaning in this
context has to do with rules of use upon which speakers agree.
Kallenberg cites Wittgenstein: "We say that we understand its [a
word's] meaning when we know its use, but we've also said that the
word 'know' doesn't denote a state of consciousness. That is, the
grammar of the word 'know' isn't the grammar of a 'state of
consciousness,' but something different. And there is only one way to
learn it to watch how the word is used in practice. " 21
The rules that govern a speaker's use of language are inextricably
bound up with the manner of their daily lives - with what
Wittgenstein calls their "form of 1ife" - the stream of Iife and thought
in which words have meaning. But skill is required for the language
user who seeks fluency and this is not simply a matter of vocabulary
and sense (Speculative grammar), for "how words are understood is
http://scholars.wlu.ca/consensus/vol29/iss2/4
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not told by words alone (theology);" rather, it is practice which gives
words their sense. For example, the correct use of the word "God"
requires that one must be familiar with the place that the languagegames of prayer and confession play in the activities of praying and
confessing.
On this interpretation ofWittgenstein's "form of life," Kallenberg
proposes that meaning include at least the following elements:

(1) Meaning is a function of the vocable context.
That is, "A sentence gains its sense from the immediate context of the
language-game in which the sentence is located." The example offered
is the sentence "All men are brutes," which has a very different nuance
in the language-game oftheology than in the language game ofajilted
lover. The language-game, however, is but a part of the flow of an
ongoing conversation where the application and interpretation of
words tluctuate. 22 Another writer notes that the appeal to the language
game also captures Wittgenstein 's notion that words are related to the
world in that they are a part of the world; they come together in
activities, language-games, constitutive of practices that comprise the
human world. McClendon observes that Wittgenstein presented a
series of imaginary games to enable his students to grasp a way of
construing word-world relations in real life:
In one game, a primitive builder instructs his
assistant by ordering any of four needed stones:
blocks, pillars, slabs, or beams ... In another, children
play word-games as they learn their native language
... Again, a shopper secures "five red apples" from
the green grocer ... Or a military commander gives
battle orders and receives reports ... In each of these
examples there is a relation to the way things are, yet
crucially, these relations include the deeds and needs
and intention of the participants. No game can even
be understood as a human activity (i.e., no proper
sense of 'meaning' can arise from its words) apart
from the forms of life, practices such as building,
shopping, playing or fighting, that make up human
endeavours. Together these practices constitute our
world. ~ 1

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2004

88

Consensus

"Meaning" in these dimensions is depicted not only in terms of
the sense of vocable but in terms of a more inclusive relation of
words and world.

(2) In addition to vocable context, Kallenberg notes that
Wittgenstein used the term "surroundings" to signify the
behavioural context, which contributes to the sense that a
speaker gains from a sentence.
Presumably, the allusion is to the existence of a multiple of language
games in the person's linguistic community. For example, giving
explanations is a correlate of requesting information or clarification;
it presupposes a certain degree of I inguistic understanding on the part
of the learner, e.g., the ability to ask for the meaning of a word, which
requires training. The latter is a learning context presupposing
recognition of an authority. Kallenberg cites Wittgenstein's example
of a lie: "a lie has a peculiar surrounding," because one cannot
announce an intention to tell a lie and then succeed in fooling anyone.
Rather, a lie succeeds as an act of deception only when other
behavioural components are in place: "Only when there is a relatively
complicated pattern of life do we speak of pretence." A wry grin,
averted eyes, a lush, a shuffle, and the game is upF~
(3) One readily understood behavioural component of grammar
is gesture.
Kallenberg cites a familiar Neapolitan behaviour of brushing the
underneath of the chin with an outward sweep of the fingertips of one
hand taken to indicate disgust or contempt. Fergus Kerr who cites
Wittgenstein notes this feature of gestures:
In my heart I have determined on it. And one is even
inclined to point to one's breast as one says it.
Psychologically this way of speaking should be
taken seriously. Why should it be taken less seriously
that the assertion that belief [der Glaube] is a state of
mind? (Luther: 'Faith [der Glaube] is under the left
nipple. ')"25
The point is that the gesture of laying a hand on one's chest when
taking an oath is like the clutching on one's brow when solving a
http://scholars.wlu.ca/consensus/vol29/iss2/4
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problem; such gestures are not less serious than the view that faith is
an inner state or a thought is in the head. Faith, like thought, is often
visible. More obvious, however, gesturing has a manifest linguistic
character since we often explain our understanding of a gesture by
translation into words and the understanding of words by translating
them into gesture. Like words, gestures are intertwined in a net of
multifarious relationships.

(4) Part of gesturing is the acknowledgement that one part of
human behaviour consists of responses like the shedding of
tears, gasping when endangered or beating one's breast.
Kallenberg describes these gestures as" ... so basic that a perspicuous
description of language can go no deeper than a record of these" and
notes that Wittgenstein applied the epithet "primitive" " ... in order to
emphasize their givenness for the functioning of language."~ What is
important here is that such gestures are not adopted to explain one's
meanings; rather, they are one's meanings. They are gestures enacting
faith, repentance, delight rather than 'real' states of mind having an
obscure mental existence in the speaker's mind. In addition to these
responses - as well as the vocable and behavioural - part of the
weave of human behaviour, is learned, social and conventional.
Children do not learn that chairs exist; they learn to climb on chairs,
sit in chairs, play musical chairs, etc. Using language is anchored in
our way of living and acting and only by involvement in the pattern
of living can one learn to use the word "chair" with facility.
Kallenberg concludes:
6

Thus the "stage-setting" or "grammar" upon which
successful linguistic interplay depends involves not
only the relation of words within a sentence, but also
the relation between the sentence and the rest of the
language-game, the relationship of this languagegame to the rest of the conversation (hence, to the
whole system of language-games), and the place of
this conversation in the activities (both primitive and
conventional) of our daily lives. This complex weave
of contextual connection is what Wittgenstein wants
his readers to glimpse in the phrase, "form of life." ~
7
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Here, the use of language is anchored in our way of living and
acting so the use of a language - its sense and significance - is
constitutive of the speaker's world and reflects a community's form
of life. In sum, this is a view which retains vocables and linguistic
syntax (scholasticism) but also captures the unique uses of ordinary
language in its pragmatic and semantic dimensions (Luther) and
hence is able to convey the nova res.
If this account is taken as a reasonable interpretation of the use
and significance, which Saarinen identifies as the uniqueness feature
of theological usage, then there is material content to Luther's view
of "theological grammar." It is to claim that the grammar of a word
(i.e., the pattern of its use) cannot be conceived apart from the way
the surrounding social group lives, acts, speaks, sees, hears, and
thinks. There is a twofold dimension to theological uniqueness here:
the first lies in the presupposition that the social group in which
contextualization occurs is ecclesial community. Secondly, Luther is
clear in his account of human action that it be understood
theologically - that is, be delineated clearly from other ways of
thinking and speaking. Hence Luther writes:
Therefore we have to rise higher in theology with the
word 'doing,' so that it becomes altogether new. For
just as it becomes something different when it is taken
from the natural area into the moral, so it becomes
something much more different when it is transferred
from philosophy and from Law into theology ...
'[D]oing' is always understood in theology as doing
with faith, so that doing with faith is another sphere
and a new realm, so to speak, one that is different from
moral doing. When we theologians speak about
'doing,' therefore, it is necessary that we speak about
doing with faith, because in theology we have no right
reason and good will except in faith. l8
Now in the Treatise on Good Works Luther does seek to provide
content and specificity to this notion of a theological grammar of
"doing with faith." He insists that good works are understood not by
reference to the alms or plans of the agent but by the discourse of
divine command. He writes:
http://scholars.wlu.ca/consensus/vol29/iss2/4
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The first thing to know is that there are no good
works except those works God has commanded ....
Therefore, whoever wants to know what good works
are as well as doing them needs to know nothing
more than God's commandments .... Accordingly,
we have to learn to recognize good works from the
commandments of God, and not from the
appearance, size, or number of the works
themselves, nor from the opinion of men of human
law or custom, as we see has happened and still
happens because of our blindness and disregard of
the divine commandments.:!')
This understanding of theological (not moral) grammar suggests
that The Treatise on Good Works be viewed as an attempt to revise
the received use of good works by reinstating a contextual connection
with the command of God that determines proper usage.
Another implication with respect to theological ethics is that
actions, which are the subject of moral or ethical appraisals, are only
properly theological because of their orientation to the command of
God. That is, theological ethics to be theological is oriented to and
focussed upon the command of God. Now "command" in this usage
is hot understood as a Kantian imperative, a universal moral
prescription, mandating the enforcement of divine determination on
human agency. Luther's exposition and the etymology of Torah
suggest that 'the law' is here understood as "to give direction," "to
point the way." It is interpreted this way by George Lindbeck who
notes that Luther does not regard divine command in the Decalogue
as law but" ... instruction or teaching (doctrina) of the type which can
variously be termed praeceptum Gebot, and mandatum. " 30 In this
respect it is interesting that there is no polemic against law in Luther's
exposition of the Ten Commandments. Rather, the explanation of the
Decalogue is shaped in pastoral discourse about the life of practice in
faith, prayer and worship. It is this kind of discourse which enables
the personal appropriation implicit in the focus or orientation to a
divine personal reality. This reality which, though separate, enables
that responsiveness in human agency which generates what Luther
calls a "simple, single, goodness" in good works without which they
are mere colour, glitter and deceit. 11
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According to Luther, the orientation of human action to the
divine command involves a special place for the first commandment.
Indeed, it is the special role of the first command coupled with the
concept of practice that displays the uniqueness of theological
grammar. Luther states:
Because this commandment is the very first of all
commandments and the highest and the best [the
one] from which all others must proceed, in which
they must exist and abide, and by which they must be
judged and assessed. Compared with this work the
other good works are like the other commandments
would be if they were without the first and as ifthere
were no God. 32
There are positive duties involved here. The second
commandment to honour God's name is not merely to forbid cursing,
the seeking of approval, fame and honour/ 3 rather, we are to use
God's name properly addressing God in praise, preaching and singing
and " ... in every way laud and magnify God's glory, honour and
name." 34 But Luther also identifies a specific relation because he
claims that the first commandment is indispensable to the second
commandment because "This, like all the other works, cannot be
done without faith." 35 The teaching of the third commandment to
hallow God's name also" ... compels faith to call upon God's name
.... So faith comes right through the third commandment, and back
into the second again." Luther states the interconnection: "See what
a pretty golden ring these three commandments and their works make
of themselves! See how the second commandment emerges from the
first commandment and its subject, faith, and runs into the third, and
the third in turn works back through the second into the first!" 36
So the faith of the first commandment coheres all
commandments and this also applies to the second table of the
Decalogue, which Involves our relation to our neighbour. Honouring
father and mother, for example, is also an expression and exercise of
faith without which" ... no work is a genuine living work: it is neither
good nor acceptable."37 But honour is never an indiscreet deference to
authority because such authority is delimited by what God expects in
the first three commandments. That all the commandments are
http://scholars.wlu.ca/consensus/vol29/iss2/4
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included in the faith of the first commandment means that it is not
enough to refrain from doing harm to our neighbour. On the contrary,
it is expected that we return good for evil, neither thinking nor
speaking evil of them, praying and thinking the best for them. 38 Once
again, faith is the connecting link of this commandment to the first
commandment: "For if we do it in faith and bring faith to bear upon
it never doubting God's grace and favor ... Jt will be quite easy for
him to be gracious and favourable to his neighbor."19
Luther's exposition does not presume that the so-called "moral
commandments" of the second table are conceptually separable from
the ostensibly "religious" commandments of the first table. Indeed,
each command in the Decalogue is conceptually inseparable, that is,
interconnected because each is sequenced in a manner which relates
it to the first command which establishes" ... the aseity, the absolute
primacy and the sheer gratuity of divine action: at the beginning of
the Decalogue stands the divine self-definition and its radically
exclusive demand." 4" Its role is strategic in governing the type and
direction of the explanation offered in the other commands and as
such it functions as a meta-command; it indicates a general direction
for a whole range of behaviour by relating everything by faith to the
one God. In sum, Luther assumes that the precepts that follow the
first commandment in the Decalogue are but a commentary on the
faith implicit in the first and great commandment.
Theologians interested in the moral dimensions of the Decalogue
have proposed that the commandments are readily understood as
associated with particular moral practices.4 ' That is, to issue the
Commandment is to presuppose a practice and to show a way of
conduct with regard to that practice. The law forbidding adultery and,
by implication, other sorts of sexual license, can only have meaning
in a culture that practices marriage. This promotes the claim that the
individual commands are interrelated as practices, which is to say
that Luther's interpretation of the law requires that we assume the
existence of a people who are part of a community constituted by
interconnected practices which make the law serve the purpose of
worshipping God. 41 Other practices are involved here: to issue the
command to honour fathers and mothers makes no sense except in a
community where there are fathers, that is, where there is a system of
kinship making the role of fathers and other relatives socially visible.
Stealing presupposes the practice of stewardship of property.
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The interrelation of the commandments coupled with the role of
the first commandment allows the discernment of certain ethical
relationships. Of course, this is no guarantee that refraining from
bearing false witness ensures that we will be trustworthy and faithful
in marriage. At the same time, just as we are only able to name and
identify violence by discovering the practices of peace in which we
are embedded, so we are only able to name, identify, and see the
connection between our sins by the practices that constitute a
community made possible by the faithfulness of worshipping God.
Similarly, it is good to speak the truth, but without acknowledging the
One who is truth, it is problematic to understand how any human
speech could be truthful and trustworthy. Again, one interpreter
develops the connection between truth-speaking and stealing by
showing how they are positive and negative witnesses to God's
generosity and the "cause of covetousness is distrust, while on the
other hand, the cause of generosity is faith." Stephen Fowl quotes
Luther's statement that stealing" ... fights not only against theft 'and
robbery, but against every kind of sharp practice which men
perpetrate against each other in matters of worldly goods. For
instance, greed, usury, overcharging, counterfeit goods, short
measure, short weight, and who could give an account of all the
smart, novel, and sharp-witted tricks which daily increase in every
trade." 43 Fowl observes that such practices only manifest the fear that
there will not be enough. Lying is fuelled by the same presumption
that people do not have the time to learn how to speak truthfully to
one another.
So the interconnection of the commandments and the inclusion
of the role of practices enable a theological grammar in which
language use is constitutive of the speaker's world and reflects a
community's form of life. It is to expose the material conditions of
"how we should practice and use faith in all good works which
Luther deemed to be his task in The Treatise on Good Works. 44

Notes
Risto Saarinen, "The Word of God In Luther's Theology," The Lutheran
Quarterly 1990:31-44. Remarking on Luther's understanding of
"grammar" he says, "The rules of philosophical language violate the
subject matter ofTheology ... ":39.

http://scholars.wlu.ca/consensus/vol29/iss2/4

Ethics As Grammar

95

Martin Luther, "Treatise on Good Works," In Luther s Works. Vol. 44
(Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Fortress Press, 1966), pp. 21-114.
John Webster, Barth s Moral Theology. Human Action In Barth s
Thought (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.,
1998),pp.152, 153.
Stanley Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, A Primer In Theological
Ethics (Notre Dame, Indiana: University ofNotre Dame Press, 1983), p.
23.
Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue. A Study In Moral Theology (Notre
Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981 ).
Fergus Kerr, Theology After Wittgenstein (London, United Kingdom:
SPCK, 1986).
Brad Kallen berg, Ethics as Gramma1; Changing the Postmodern Subject
(Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001 ).
James McClendon with Nancey Murphy, Jr., Witness. Systematic
Theology Volume 3 (Nashville, Tennessee: Abingdon Press, 2000).
Wittgenstein's religious orientation has been a topic of Interest to many
of his Interpreters and biographers though McClendon in Part II,
Chapter 6 of his work makes his position clear: "Ludwig Wittgenstein:
A Christian In Philosophy."
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, ed. G. E. M.
Anscombe and R. Rhees, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford, United
Kingdom: Blackwell, 1975), pp. 370-371.
ID

Ibid., p. 373.

11

Fergus Kerr, Theology After Wittgenstein, pp. 145 ff.

11

Alice Ambrose, "Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge 1932-1935,"
From the Notes of Alice Ambrose and Margaret Macdonald (Amherst,
New York: Prometheus, 2001), p. 32.

"

Ibid., p. II 0. Kallen berg is citing from Wittgenstein in Zettel§ 144 and
his remarks are directed to the self-involving character of theological
discourse where words are not only vocables of a language but rooted In
the "stream of life" giving them their proper senses; communication
requires self-involving participation in the host form of life.

1
"

Martin Luther, "Lectures on Galatians - 1535" in Luther s Works, Vol.
26 & 27 (St. Louis, Missouri: 1963, 1964), pp. 262ff. Cf. pp. 4f., 6, 8,
32, 38,267.

'' Risto
Saarinen,
"The Word
of God
Published
by Scholars
Commons
@ Laurier,
2004 in Luther's Theology":31-44.

Consensus

96
16

Ibid., 39. Saarinen is remarking on WA 2.267.32-35, WA 6.28-29, and
WA 6.29.5-8.

17

Ibid., 39. He says:" ... Luther includes in 'grammar' both the linguistic
syntax and meaning as well as the use (signicatio, usus) of language,
because he thinks that the grammar of the biblical text is detennined by
the text's message. Because the meaning (sensus) and the subject matter
(res) of the words thus become connected to the grammatical wordlevel, Luther's position was called a 'realistic' understanding of
grammar."

II

19

°

Ibid., 41.
Martin Luther, "Lectures on Galatians - 1535" in Luther s Works, Vol.
26, p. 262.

1

Kallen berg, Ethics as Grammm; p. I 03. He is citing Ludwig
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar §60. tr. Anthony Kenny, ed. Rush
Rhees (Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California
Press, 1974).

21

Ibid., p. 105. The citation is from Philosophical Grammar §34.

"

Ibid.

11

James McClendon Jr. with Nancey Murphy, Witness, Systematic
Theology Volume 3, p. 251. McClendon is quoting fonn the Blue and
Brown Books, 77-79; 17, 81; and Philosophical Investigations §I, §2,
§7. §19).

"" Ibid., p. 105. While not essential to this issue there is Wittgenstein's
view about avowals in the background. He claims that telling lies and
deceiving are intentional attitudes which are meaningful but not because
they allude to inner mental processes. Rather we ascribe such attitudes
to persons and they are meaningful when (a) they are avowals, i.e.,
express, display but not describe the attitude which is intentional and
meaningful if there are not grounds for questioning the sincerity of the
speaker. (b) What the speaker means is clear from how, ifthe occasion
arises, he explains, clarifies, elaborates his utterances, what
consequences he derives from them and the replies and reactions he
accepts as pertinent. (c) Context that involves how the sentence uttered
fits into the topic of the conversation, the speaker's background and
about whom or what he had reason to speak. Cf. Hans-Johann Glock, A
Wittgenstein DictionGiy (Oxford, United Kingdom: Blackwell, 1996), p.
181.
21

Fergus Kerr, Theology After Wittgenstein. Kerr is quoting form the
Philosophical Investigations §89.

http://scholars.wlu.ca/consensus/vol29/iss2/4

Ethics As Grammar
16

Ibid., p. 106.

11

Ibid., p. 107.

1

~

97

Martin Luther, "Lectures on Galatians - 1535" in Luther s Works, Vol.
26, p. 262.

1
•

"Treatise on Good Works," p. 18/4, section 1, lines 1-10.

"'

George Lindbeck, "Mattin Luther and the Rabbinic Mind," in Peter
Ochs, ed., Understanding the Rabbinic Mind: Essays on the
Hermeneutic of Max Kadushin (Atlanta, Georgia: Scholar's Press,
1990), p. 51.

11

"Treatise on Good Works," p. 22 (17/3)

11

Ibid., 22/8 line 5.

"

Ibid., 2911 5 line, 30-32.

u

Ibid., 27113 line 7,8.

''

Ibid., 2711 3 line 5.

••

Ibid., 49/35 line 27, 28. He says on p. 49/35 line 14-18: "The first work
is to believe and to have a good heatt and confidence in God. From this
flows the second good work, to praise God 's name, to confess his grace,
to give all honor to him alone. Then follows the third, to worship God
by praying, hearing the sermon, meditating upon and pondering God's
benefits, and, in addition, chastising oneself and keeping the flesh
subdued."

"

Ibid., 53/39, line 30-33.

'R

Ibid., 61 /47, linel9-22.

'"

Ibid., 62/48, line 22-25 .

••

John Webster, Barth s Moral Theology, Human Action in Barth s
Thought (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1998), p.l61.

•

1

1

James Wm. McClendon, Jr., Ethics: Systematic TheologJ~
Volume I (Nashville, Tennessee: Abingdon, 1986), p.l77.

Stanley Hauerwas, Sanctify them In the Truth, Holiness Exemplified
(Nashville, Tennessee: Abingdon, 1998), p. 52. " .. .In order for us to
know what it means not to steal or not to tell a lie, we must understand
why it is that none of the commandments can stand on their own and
why it is that their vital interconnection is necessary for the formation of
a community of a people capable of friendship with one another and
with God (p. 54 ST)."
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2004
•

98

Consensus

41

"The Treatise on Good Works," p.64/50, line 3.

44

Ibid., 18/4, line 3.

http://scholars.wlu.ca/consensus/vol29/iss2/4

